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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD 1R. BLACK, D .D.S . and
PATRICIA BLACK,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

)
)
Case No. 14358

vs.
DR. JAMES S. BOYCE,
Defendant and Respondent.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages brought by the buyers
of corporate stock against the seller for an illegal sale
of the stock which was the subject matter of the buyers1
conditional sales agreement contrary to the requirements
of the Utah law on recission of contract.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court.

From a verdict for

the defendant of no cause of action the plaintiffs appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek to have the judgment of the Trial
Court reversed and a new trial granted to determine plaintiffs1
damages from the wrongful sale of the purchased stock.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In August, 1961, the plaintiffs and the defendant, together with one, Doctor E. Wayne Allrou, purchased
a property fronting on State Street in Orem, Utah.

The

property had formerly been a motel and had an approximate
size of three and one-half acres.

(Tr. 4) After acquisi-

tion the owners of the property incorporated under the
name of Orem Professional Plaza, Inc.

and issued 90

shares of stock, 30 shares to each of them.
lines 7-11)

(Tr. 6

They then transferred all of the property to

the corporation.

(Tr. 14 lines 2-9)

Each of the three

owners established their professional offices in separate
suites in the former motel property.

In 196^ the defend-

ant moved his dental practice to the State of California
(Tr. 6 lines 25-27) and in 1964 negotiated to sell plaintiffs his 30 shares of stock in Orem Professional Plaza,
Inc.

(Tr. 6 lines 28-30)

On June 4, 1964, the defendant

forwarded a letter consummating the transaction (ex. 4)
and a letter of resignation (Ex. 5) as officer and director of the corporation.

(Tr. 7 lines 20-25)

No formal

agreement was prepared for the stock purchase, but the
plaintiffs executed a promissory note for $3,34 3.20 (Ex.
2) (Tr. 8 lines 4-9 and Tr. 8 lines 25-30)

The defendant,

seller of the stock, retained possession of the stock
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certificates, the parties agreeing by their testimony that" the
stock was to be transferred upon completion of payment.
64 lines 3-7 and 23-30)

(Tr.

The plaintiffs made irregular payments

to the defendant on the promissory note through May 13, 1967.
(Ex. 7) (Tr. 9 lines 3-7)

In 1964 four payments were made, in

1965 two payments, two in 1966, and in 1967 three, all of
different and varying amounts.

(Ex. 7)

By February 28, 1967

plaintiffs had made advance payments of $102.02, more than
required by the terms of the promissory note.
1967, they were $45.46 paid in advance.

By May 13,

By July 7, 1967,

according to the terms of the promissory note thev were $65.93
in arrears. On July 7, 1967, the defendant claimed to have
sent a letter to the Plaintiff, Richard R. Black, but not
addressed to the Plaintiff, Patricia Black, the other purchaser
(Ex. 8) (Tr. 17 lines 26^0, Tr. 18 lines 19-29) Tne letter was
never received by the plaintiffs.

(Tr. 29 lines 16-21) There-

after, on December 6, 1967, the defendant received a letter
from the plaintiffs (Ex.

6) together with a check for two

installments in the sum of $111.76.
10 lines 2-7)

(Tr. 9 lines 24-20, Tr.

The letter informed the defendant that the

plaintiffs would pay two payments monthly and had sold otner
property by which they, would soon be able to pay the balance
owing upon the note.

The defendant did not respond to the

letter but banked the payments received wit:: the letter. Z:\
August 7, 1967, prior to the receipt of the two installments
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and the letter of December 5, 1967, the defendant sold
the 30 shares of stoch to the other stockholders of Crcm
Professional Plaza for tne then re.fining unpaid bal\nce
upon the promissory note,

(Tr. 13 .lines 17-21) No

further notice of any kind wai givsn to the plaintiffs.
:;o notification was given to the plaintiffs after the
receipt of the two installments and tne letter of December
6, 1967 which informed the plaintiffs of the- prior sale
of the stock to the other owners of the Ore:. Professional
Piaz-, Inc.

(Tr. 67 lines i-10)

After the letter of

December 6, 1967 from the plaintiffs to the defendant no
furthe- communication transferred between them.

Tne

reafter, the other owners of Orem Professional Plaza
made a demand for rentals and eventually evicted the
plaintiffs from the Professional Offices.
ARGUMENT

(Ex. 9)

POINT I
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
APPELLANTS MOVED TO CALIFORNIA WHEN, IN FACT,
THE APPELLANTS REMAINED IN THE PROPERTY BEING
PURCHASED THROUGH THE ENTIRE CONTRACT
In the decision rendered by the Supreme Court
the writer says that the defendants tried to carry out
the stock transaction after the appellants had leftUtah and gone to California.

The Supreme Court misinterpreted

-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the parties and concluded that the appellants/buyers of
the stock had moved to California when, in fact, the records
show that the defendant/seller moved to California and the
buyers remained in possession of the premises being purchased.
At Tr. 6f lines 25-27, appellants1 counsel in questioning
Defendant, Dr. James S. Boyce, asked:
Q:

"In 196 3 you moved your practice to
California?"

A:

"Yes."

The decision went on to conclude that the defendant tried to
carry out the stock transaction by mail.

However, the

evidence indicates that the correspondence as to failure to
pay a payment under a promissory note was never received.
The documents in issue show that the purchase was not a
stock purchase agreement but a promissory note coupled
with an oral agreement (Ex. 2, a photocopy of the installment
note executed by plaintiffs, Dr. Richard Black and Patricia
Black, in connection with the sale of the stock and the
testimony of Defendant, Dr. James S. Boyce (Tr. 8, lines 25-30)):
Q:

"Now, Dr. Boyce, were there any other written
agreement prepared to carry out the sale of
this 30 shares of Orem Professional Plaza,
Inc. by yourself to Dr. Black, other than
the documents that I have presented to the
Court?.

A:

"None to my knowledge."

There were no provisions in the installment note for forfeiture
of the interest of Dr. Black in the stock or for notice.
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-• ---POINT II

_.

THE SUPREME COURT MISINTERPRETED THE ACTION AS
ONE FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WHEN IN FACT IT
WAS A SUIT FOR DAMAGES
This Court's ruling assumes this to be an action
in specific performance.
Appeal from a Judge - tried case resulting
in a no cause of action judgment, in a
specific performance case where the parties
agreed to buy and sell, on condition, a
medical facility. Black v. Boyce, Supreme
Court of Utah Decision filed July 2 7, 19 76
At the time of the commencement of the action the
plaintiffs brought suit tentatively for specific performance
or damages. Prior to the time of trial it was determined by
discovery that the defendant had previously sold the stock and
disposed of the stock and, therefore, the only recourse the
plaintiffs had was a suit for damages.

That it was to be

a suit for damages is shown by statement of defendant's
counsel.

(Tr. 40, lines 9-12)
Well, of course, he has brought a lawsuit for
damages, but the record shows, without dispute,
that he has never tendered performance or
the monies that were due under the Note.
POINT III

THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF
RESCISSION OF THE PURCHASE CONTRACT UNDER UTAH LAW
WHERE THE DEFENDANT/SELLER OF THE STOCK ELECTED TO
RESCIND THE CONTRACT AND TO SELL THE STOCK TO OTHERS
The instant case is not simply one, as the Court
in its decision stated, "where someone assumes he should
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be apprised-of his own failure to comply w^ith the terms
with respect to payments."

The seller moved from the

State of Utah and thereafter accepted irregular payments
over a four (4) year period.

The buyers sometimes were

paid ahead and sometimes were in arrears in their payments
during said period, until May 13, 1967.

(Ex. 7; Tr. 9,

_lines 3-7)

The seller had acquiesced in such irregular

payments.

If he then intended to hold the buyers to the

strict terms of the note, notice of such intent should have been
communicated.
The action of the defendant in selling the stock
without a return of the consideration constitutes a
forfeiture of the plaintiffs1 rights in the matter.
As this Court has recently decided in Fullmer v.
Blood, (1976), 546 P.2d 606:
. . . When a seller accepts late payments
which allow a buyer to believe the forfeiture
provision will not be strictly enforced,
the court will not enforce it unless notice
is given and a reasonable time allowed to
-~r
>*—
make the delinquencies; and that where the
"'> ~-N vforfeiture of the amount that has been paid
-, *" in would be so inequitable as to be unconscionable the court of equity will refuse to
enforce it. Malmberg v. Baugh, (1923),
62 Utah 331, 508 P. 975; Lamont v. Evjen,
(1973), 29 Utah 2d 266, 508 P.2d 532;
Paul v. Kitty 544 P.2d 886 (Utah December
1975) Id.at 609
Without question, the seller had the right to retain
the stock until paid and might also have a right to rescind
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under certain conditions.

Section 60-4-2, Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended, sets forth the remedies
of an unpaid seller:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this title,
notwithstanding that the property in the goods
may have passed to the buyer, the unpaid
seller of goods, as such, has:
(a) A lien on the goods or right to
retain them for the price while he is
in possession of them.

(c) A right of resale as limited by
this title.
(d) A right to rescind the sale as
limited by this title.
(2) Where the property in goods has not passed
to the buyer, the unpaid seller has, in addition
to his other remedies, a right of withholding
delivery similar to, and coexistensive with, his
rights of lien and stoppage in transitu where
the property has passed to the buyer.
In this case since title had not passed to the buyers (plaintiffs),
the seller (defendant) had a right of withholding delivery
until he was paid.

^

If the seller elects to rescind, notice, which
is not only sent to but received by the buyer, would be
necessarily coupled with the requirement of refund of the
consideration paid to restore the former status of the
parties.
This Court in Perry v. Woodall, (1968), 20 Utah 2d
299, 438 P.2d 813, at page 401, stated:
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~

The law is well settled that one electing
to rescind a contract must tender back to
the other contracting party whatever
property of value he has received.

This was emphasized by the Court in Wingets v.
Bitters , (1922), 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007:
In the strict legal or equitable sense, the
term 'rescission1 imports the concept of
completely annulling a contract as if it
had never existed. This includes the idea
of restoring the parties to their former
status, and the return by each to the
other of what had been received under it.
[emphasis supplied]
The claimed notice of rescission, although disputed
as to its receipt, could not constitute a rescission of the
contract since the requirement of notice of rescission is
coupled with an obligation to return the consideration or the
obligation to sell the merchandise (the stock in this case)
for the best possible price obtainable therefor and credit
the buyer.

Knudsen Music Co. v. Masterson, (1952) 121 Utah

252, 240 P.2d 1973, 17 Am. Jur. 2d; Peterson v. Hodges, (1951)
121 Utah 72, 2 39 P.2d 180. The default, if any, of the
buyers may.absolve the seller from further performance but
does not give him the right to sell the stock without
return of the consideration.
The effects of the Court's decision is to allow the
defendant to retain the purchase price paid by the buyers
and also to rescind the contract and resell the stock without
complying with the rule of law on rescission.
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CONCLUSION
Appellants herein should be given a rehearing of
this matter so that the issues presented to the Court on
appeal can be argued and the Court be given an opportunity
to redress this wrong and error committed by the trial
court.
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of August,
1976.

M. Dayle Je
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief
of Appellants in Support of Petition for Rehearing was
mailed to Clair M. Aldrich, Attorney for Defendant, 43 East
200 North, Provo, Utah 84601, by placing a copy of same
in the United States Mails, postage prepaid, this 16th
day of August, 19 76.
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